


Formal Methods for Robust Artificial Intelligence State of the Art


Caterina Urban

ANTIQUÉ Research Team, Inria & École Normale Supérieure | Université PSL



Artificial Intelligence Development Process

Artificial Intelligence Pipeline




Model Training is Highly Non-Deterministic



model training



model deployment





predictions



no **predictability** and **traceability**

Models Only Give Probabilistic Guarantees



not sufficient for guaranteeing
an **acceptable failure rate**
under any circumstances

Safety-Critical Artificial Intelligence

¹ STAT⁺₂

IBM's Watson supercomputer recommended 'unsafe and incorrect' cancer treatments, internal documents show

By [Casey Ross](#)³ [@caseymross](#)⁴ and Ike Swetlitz

July 25, 2018



A self-driving Uber ran a red light last December, contrary to company claims


Feds Say Self-Driving Uber SUV Did Not Recognize Jaywalking Pedestrian In Fatal Crash

[Richard Gonzales](#) November 7, 2019 10:57 PM ET




Formal Methods

Mathematical Guarantees of Safety



Deductive Verification

- extremely **expressive**
- **relies on the user** to guide the proof



Model Checking

- analysis of a **model** of the software
- **sound and complete** with respect to the model





Static Analysis

- analysis of the software at some level of **abstraction**
- fully **automatic** and **sound** by construction
- generally **not complete**




Neural Network Models




Feed-Forward Neural Networks


Fully-Connected Layers with **ReLU** Activation Functions



Safety Verification



Model Checking Methods



SMT-Based Methods

Safety Verification Reduced to **Constraint Satisfiability**

$$\mathbf{l}_j \leq \mathbf{x}_{0,j} \leq \mathbf{u}_j$$

$$j \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbf{X}_0| \}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$$

$$x_{i,j} = \max\{0, \hat{x}_{i,j}\}$$

$$i \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}, j \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbf{X}_i| \}$$

$$\mathbf{x}_N \leq \mathbf{0}$$

satisfiable \rightarrow **X** counterexample
otherwise \rightarrow **✓** safe

input specification



(negation of)
output specification

Planet



use **approximations** to
reduce the solution search space


$$x_{i,j} = \max\{0, \hat{x}_{i,j}\}$$




$$0 \leq x_{i,j}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j}$$

$$x_{i,j} \leq \frac{b_{i,j}}{b_{i,j} - a_{i,j}} \cdot (\hat{x}_{i,j} - a_{i,j})$$



Reluplex




based on the **simplex algorithm**
extended to support ReLU constraints

Variable	Value
x_{00}	v_{00}
...	...
\hat{x}_{ij}	\hat{v}_{ij}
x_{ij}	v_{ij}
...	...
x_N	v_N



Variable	Value
x_{00}	v_{00}
...	...
\hat{x}_{ij}	\hat{v}'_{ij}
x_{ij}	v_{ij}
...	...
x_N	v_N




Variable	Value
x_{00}	v_{00}
...	...
\hat{x}_{ij}	\hat{v}'_{ij}
x_{ij}	\hat{v}'_{ij}
...	...
x_N	v_N



...

Variable	Value
x_{00}	v_{00}
...	...
\hat{x}_{ij}	\hat{v}'_{ij}
x_{ij}	0
...	...
x_N	v_N



...

Reluplex




based on the **sim**
extended to support


Follow-up Work

G. Katz et al. - The Marabou Framework for Verification and Analysis of Deep Neural Networks (CAV 2019)

Variable	Value
\mathbf{x}_{00}	v_{00}
...	...
$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{ij}$	\hat{v}_{ij}
\mathbf{x}_{ij}	v_{ij}
...	...
\mathbf{x}_N	v_N




Variable	Value
\mathbf{x}_{00}	v_{00}
...	...
$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{ij}$	\hat{v}'_{ij}
\mathbf{x}_{ij}	v_{ij}
...	...
\mathbf{x}_N	v_N



Variable	Value
\mathbf{x}_{00}	v_{00}
...	...
$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{ij}$	\hat{v}'_{ij}
\mathbf{x}_{ij}	\hat{v}'_{ij}
...	...
\mathbf{x}_N	v_N

Variable	Value
\mathbf{x}_{00}	v_{00}
...	...
$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{ij}$	\hat{v}'_{ij}
\mathbf{x}_{ij}	0
...	...
\mathbf{x}_N	v_N



...

Other SMT-Based Methods

- L. Pulina and A. Tacchella - An Abstraction-Refinement Approach to Verification of Artificial Neural Networks (CAV 2010)
the first formal verification method for neural networks
- O. Bastani, Y. Ioannou, L. Lampropoulos, D. Vytiniotis, A. Nori, and A. Criminisi - Measuring Neural Net Robustness with Constraints (NeurIPS 2016)
an approach for finding the nearest adversarial example according to the L_∞ distance
- X. Huang, M. Kwiatkowska, S. Wang, and M. Wu - Safety Verification of Deep Neural Networks (CAV 2017)
an approach for proving local robustness to adversarial perturbations
- N. Narodytska, S. Kasiviswanathan, L. Ryzhyk, M. Sagiv, and T. Walsh - Verifying Properties of Binarized Deep Neural Networks (AAAI 2018)
C. H. Cheng, G. Nührenberg, C. H. Huang, and H. Ruess - Verification of Binarized Neural Networks via Inter-Neuron Factoring (VSTTE 2018)
approaches focusing on binarized neural networks

MILP-Based Methods

Safety Verification Reduced to Mixed Integer Linear Program

$$l_j \leq x_{0,j} \leq u_j$$

$$j \in \{0, \dots, |X_0|\}$$

input specification

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|X_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j} \quad i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$$

$$x_{i,j} = \delta_{i,j} \cdot \hat{x}_{i,j}$$


$$\delta_{i,j} = 1 \Rightarrow \hat{x}_{i,j} \geq 0$$

$$\delta_{i,j} = 0 \Rightarrow \hat{x}_{i,j} < 0$$

$$\delta_{i,j} \in \{0, 1\}$$

$$i \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$$

$$j \in \{0, \dots, |X_i|\}$$



min x_N

min $x_N \leq 0 \rightarrow$ ~~X~~ counterexample
otherwise \rightarrow  safe

objective function

MILP-Based Methods


Bounded MILP Encoding with Symmetric Bounds

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j} \quad i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot \delta_{i,j} \quad \delta_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j}) \quad i \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$$

$$\mathbf{M}_{i,j} = \max\{-l_i, u_i\} \quad j \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbf{X}_i|\}$$



Sherlock

Output Range Analysis



use **local search**
speed up the MILP solver

$$l_j \leq x_{0,j} \leq u_j$$

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot \delta_{i,j}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j})$$

$$\mathbf{M}_{i,j} = \max\{-l_i, u_i\}$$

$$\min \mathbf{x}_N$$

Sherlock

Output Range Analysis

$$\mathbf{l}_j \leq \mathbf{x}_{0,j} \leq \mathbf{u}_j$$

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \cdot \delta_{i,j}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j})$$

$$\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} = \max\{-\mathbf{l}_i, \mathbf{u}_i\}$$

$$\min \mathbf{x}_N$$



use **local search**
speed up the MILP solver

sample random input **X**
and evaluate output **L**

Sherlock

Output Range Analysis



use **local search**
speed up the MILP solver

$$\mathbf{l}_j \leq \mathbf{x}_{0,j} \leq \mathbf{u}_j$$

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \cdot \delta_{i,j}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j})$$

$$\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} = \max\{-\mathbf{l}_i, \mathbf{u}_i\}$$

$$\mathbf{x}_N < \mathbf{L}$$

sample random input **X**
and evaluate output **L**



Sherlock

Output Range Analysis



use **local search**
speed up the MILP solver

$$l_j \leq x_{0,j} \leq u_j$$

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot \delta_{i,j}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j})$$

$$\mathbf{M}_{i,j} = \max\{-l_i, u_i\}$$

$$\mathbf{x}_N < \mathbf{L}$$



find another input $\hat{\mathbf{X}}$
such that $\hat{\mathbf{L}} \leq \mathbf{x}_N$

Sherlock

Output Range Analysis



use **local search**
speed up the MILP solver

$$l_j \leq x_{0,j} \leq u_j$$

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot \delta_{i,j}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j})$$

$$\mathbf{M}_{i,j} = \max\{-l_i, u_i\}$$

$$\mathbf{x}_N < \hat{\mathbf{L}}$$

find another input $\hat{\mathbf{X}}$
such that $\hat{\mathbf{L}} \leq \mathbf{x}_N$



Sherlock

Output Range Analysis



use **local search**
speed up the MILP solver

$$l_j \leq x_{0,j} \leq u_j$$


$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot \delta_{i,j}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{M}_{i,j} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j})$$

$$\mathbf{M}_{i,j} = \max\{-l_i, u_i\}$$

$$\mathbf{x}_N < \hat{\mathbf{L}}$$



find another input $\hat{\mathbf{X}}$
such that $\hat{\mathbf{L}} \leq \mathbf{x}_N$

MILP-Based Methods

Bounded MILP Encoding with Asymmetric Bounds

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j} \quad i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{u}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \cdot \delta_{i,j} \quad \delta_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}$$

$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{l}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j}) \quad i \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$$
$$j \in \{0, \dots, |\mathbf{X}_i|\}$$



MIPVerify

Finding Nearest Adversarial Example

$$\min_{\mathbf{X}'} d(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{X}')$$

$$\hat{x}_{i+1,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{|\mathbf{X}_i|} w_{j,k}^i \cdot x_{i,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$0 \leq x_{i,j} \leq \mathbf{u}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \cdot \delta_{i,j}$$


$$\hat{x}_{i,j} \leq x_{i,j} \leq \hat{x}_{i,j} - \mathbf{l}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \cdot (1 - \delta_{i,j})$$

$$\mathbf{x}_N \neq \mathbf{0}$$


Other MILP-Based Methods

- R. Bunel, I. Turkaslan, P. H. S. Torr, P. Kohli, and M. P. Kumar - A Unified View of Piecewise Linear Neural Network Verification (NeurIPS 2018)
a unifying verification framework for piecewise-linear ReLU neural networks
- C.-H. Cheng, G. Nührenberg, and H. Ruess - Maximum Resilience of Artificial Neural Networks (ATVA 2017)
an approach for finding a lower bound on robustness to adversarial perturbations
- M. Fischetti and J. Jo - Deep Neural Networks and Mixed Integer Linear Optimization (2018)
an approach for feature visualization and building adversarial examples

Static Analysis Methods



Abstract Interpretation-Based Methods



Symbolic Propagation



represent each neuron as a
linear combination of the **inputs**
and the **ReLU**s in previous layers


$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} \sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \mathbf{c}_k \cdot \mathbf{x}_k + \mathbf{c} & \mathbf{c}_k, \mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{R}^{|\mathbf{X}_k|} \\ [a, b] & a, b \in \mathcal{R} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_{i-1,0} &\mapsto \mathbf{E}_{i-1,0} \\ \dots & \\ x_{i-1,j} &\mapsto \mathbf{E}_{i-1,j} \\ \dots & \end{aligned}$$

$$x_{i,j} = \sum_k w_{j,k}^{i-1} \cdot x_{i-1,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \sum_k w_{j,k}^{i-1} \cdot \mathbf{E}_{i-1,k} + b_{i,j}$$

$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} \mathbf{E}_{i,j} \\ [a, b] \end{cases}$$



$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} \mathbf{E}_{i,j} \\ [a, b] \end{cases}$$

$$0 \leq a$$

$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} \mathbf{x}_{i,j} \\ [0, b] \end{cases}$$

$$a < 0 \wedge 0 < b$$

$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} 0 \\ [0, 0] \end{cases}$$



$$b \leq 0$$

DeepPoly



maintain **symbolic lower- and upper-bounds** for each neuron
+ **convex ReLU approximations**


$$x_{i+1,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} [\sum_k c_{i,k} \cdot x_{i,k} + c, \sum_k d_{i,k} \cdot x_{i,k} + d] & c_{i,k}, c, d_{i,k}, d \in \mathcal{R} \\ [a, b] & a, b \in \mathcal{R} \end{cases}$$



Other Abstract Interpretation Methods

- T. Gehr, M. Mirman, D. Drachsler-Cohen, P. Tsankov, S. Chaudhuri, and M. Vechev - AI2: Safety and Robustness Certification of Neural Networks with Abstract Interpretation (S&P 2018)
the first use of abstract interpretation for verifying neural networks
- G. Singh, T. Gehr, M. Mirman, M. Püschel, and M. Vechev - Fast and Effective Robustness Certification (NeurIPS 2018)
a custom zonotope domain for certifying neural networks
- G. Singh, R. Ganvir, M. Püschel, and M. Vechev - Beyond the Single Neuron Convex Barrier for Neural Network Certification (NeurIPS 2019)
a framework to jointly approximate k ReLU activations
- C. Urban, M. Christakis, V. Wüstholtz, and F. Zhang - Perfectly Parallel Fairness Certification of Neural Networks (OOPSLA 2020)
an approach for verifying fairness of neural network classifiers for tabular data

Other Complete Methods



Star Sets

Exact Static Analysis Method




use **union** of
efficient representations
of bounded convex polyhedra

$$\Theta \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle c, V, P \rangle$$

$c \in \mathcal{R}^n$: center

$V = \{v_1, \dots, v_m\}$: basis vectors in \mathcal{R}^n

$P: \mathcal{R}^m \rightarrow \{ \perp, \top \}$: predicate



$$\llbracket \Theta \rrbracket = \{ x \mid x = c + \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i v_i \text{ such that } P(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m) = \top \}$$

- fast and cheap **affine mapping operations** \rightarrow neural network layers
- inexpensive **intersections with half-spaces** \rightarrow ReLU activations

Star Sets

Exact Static Analysis Method



use
efficient r
of bounded

Follow-up Work


H.-D. Tran et al. - Verification of Deep Convolutional Neural Networks Using ImageStars (CAV 2020)

$$\Theta \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle c, V, P \rangle$$

$c \in \mathcal{R}^n$: center

$V = \{v_1, \dots, v_m\}$: basis vectors in \mathcal{R}^n

$P: \mathcal{R}^m \rightarrow \{ \perp, \top \}$: predicate



$$\llbracket \Theta \rrbracket = \{ x \mid x = c + \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i v_i \text{ such that } P(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m) = \top \}$$



- fast and cheap **affine mapping operations** \rightarrow neural network layers
- inexpensive **intersections with half-spaces** \rightarrow ReLU activations

ReluVal

Asymptotically Complete Method



use symbolic propagation
+ **iterative** input **refinement**




Neurify

Asymptotically Complete Method



use symbolic propagation
+ **convex ReLU approximation**
+ **iterative** input and ReLU **refinement**


$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} [\sum_k c_{0,k} \cdot x_{0,k} + c, \sum_k d_{0,k} \cdot x_{0,k} + d] & c_{0,k}, c, d_{0,k}, d \in \mathcal{R} \\ [a, b] & a, b \in \mathcal{R} \end{cases}$$



Other Complete Methods

- W. Ruan, X. Huang, and Marta Kwiatkowska - Reachability Analysis of Deep Neural Networks with Provable Guarantees (IJCAI 2018)
a global optimization-based approach for verifying Lipschitz continuous neural networks
- G. Singh, T. Gehr, M. Püschel, and M. Vechev - Boosting Robustness Certification of Neural Networks (ICLR 2019)
an approach combining abstract interpretation and (mixed integer) linear programming

Other **Incomplete** Methods




Interval Neural Networks

Abstraction-Based Method



merge neurons layer-wise
according to partitioning strategy and
replace weights with intervals



Interval Neural Networks


Abstraction-Based Method



merge neurons
according to partitioning
replace weights with intervals

Related Work

Y. Y. Elboher et al. - An
Abstraction-Based Framework
for Neural Network Verification
(CAV 2020)



Other Incomplete Methods

- W. Xiang, H.-D. Tran, and T. T. Johnson - Output Reachable Set Estimation and Verification for Multi-Layer Neural Networks (2018)
an approach combining simulation and linear programming
- K. Dvijotham, R. Stanforth, S. Gowal, T. Mann, and P. Kohli - A Dual Approach to Scalable Verification of Deep Networks (UAI 2018)
an approach based on duality for verifying neural networks
- E. Wong and Z. Kolter - Provable Defenses Against Adversarial Examples via the Convex Outer Adversarial Polytope (ICML 2018)
A. Raghunathan, J. Steinhardt, and P. Liang - Certified Defenses against Adversarial Examples (ICML 2018)
T.-W. Weng, H. Zhang, H. Chen, Z. Song, C.-J. Hsieh, L. Daniel, D. Boning, and I. Dhillon. Towards Fast Computation of Certified Robustness for ReLU Networks (ICML 2018)
H. Zhang, T.-W. Weng, P.-Y. Chen, C.-J. Hsieh, and L. Daniel - Efficient Neural Network Robustness Certification with General Activation Functions (NeurIPS 2018)
approaches for finding a lower bound on robustness to adversarial perturbations

Other Incomplete Methods

- A. Boopathy, T.-W. Weng, P.-Y. Chen, S. Liu, and L. Daniel - CNN-Cert: An Efficient Framework for Certifying Robustness of Convolutional Neural Networks (AAAI 2019)
approach focusing on convolutional neural networks
- C.-Y. Ko, Z. Lyu, T.-W. Weng, L. Daniel, N. Wong, and D. Lin - POPQORN: Quantifying Robustness of Recurrent Neural Networks (ICML 2019)
H. Zhang, M. Shinn, A. Gupta, A. Gurfinkel, N. Le, and N. Narodytska - Verification of Recurrent Neural Networks for Cognitive Tasks via Reachability Analysis (ECAI 2020)
approaches focusing on recurrent neural networks
- D. Gopinath, H. Converse, C. S. Pasareanu, and A. Taly - Property Inference for Deep Neural Networks (ASE 2019)
an approach for inferring safety properties of neural networks

Complete Methods

ADVANTAGES

- sound and **complete**

DISADVANTAGES

- soundness not typically guaranteed with respect to **floating-point arithmetic**
- **do not scale** to large models
- often **limited** to certain model **architectures**

Incomplete Methods

ADVANTAGES

- **able to scale** to large models
- sound often also with respect to **floating-point arithmetic**
- **less limited** to certain model **architectures**

DISADVANTAGES

- suffer from **false positives**

QUESTIONS?