## Machine Learning Interpretability and Verification



Caterina Urban Inria & École Normale Supérieure







## **Machine Learning in High-Stakes Systems**





#### **ML software**







perform tasks that are impossible using explicit programming



#### act as surrogate model



automate decision-making



## Machine Learning Development Process Machine Learning Pipeline





## **Models Only Give Probabilistic Guarantees**



DESPITE OUR GREAT RESEARCH RESULTS, SOME HAVE QUESTIONED OUR AI-BASED METHODOLOGY. BUT WE TRAINED A CLASSIFIER ON A COLLECTION OF GOOD AND BAD METHODOLOGY SECTIONS, AND IT SAYS OURS IS FINE.



model deployment





predictions

not sufficient for guaranteeing an acceptable failure rate under all circumstances



## **Models Only Give Probabilistic Guarantees Adversarial Examples**



 $\boldsymbol{x}$ 

"panda" 57.7% confidence  $+.007 \times$ 



 $\operatorname{sign}(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \boldsymbol{x}, y))$ "nematode" 8.2% confidence



x + $\epsilon \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \boldsymbol{x}, y))$ "gibbon" 99.3 % confidence

Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2015

#### EXPLAINING AND HARNESSING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES

Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens & Christian Szegedy Google Inc., Mountain View, CA {goodfellow, shlens, szegedy}@google.com





# FORMAL LETHODS DINUNTY TRADITIONAL SAFETY-CRITICAL SOFTWARE



## Models Only Give Probabilistic Guarantees Local Robustness Verification

#### **Machine Learning Community**/



#### **Formal Methods Community**



7

## **Machine Learning Development Process Machine Learning Pipeline**



#### model deployment





#### predictions



### **Robust Training** Minimizing the Worst-Case Loss for Each Input



loss function (e.g, cross-entropy)

## $\mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y})\in\mathcal{D}}\left[\max_{\mathbf{x}'\in\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{x})}\mathcal{L}(f(\boldsymbol{\theta},\mathbf{x}'),\mathbf{y})\right]$

neural network

perturbation domain





#### **Robust Training Certified Training**

BUST	Bench	
15	<ul> <li>entrie</li> </ul>	25
*		Meth
	15	15 entrie

#### Robust Principles: Architec Adversarially F It uses additional 50M syn

#### Machine Learning Community

Table 7: Comparison of the standard (Acc.), adversarial (Adv. Acc), and certified (Cert. Acc.) accuracy for different certified training methods on the full CIFAR-10 test set. We use MN-BAB (Ferrari et al., 2022) to compute all certified and adversarial accuracies.

$\epsilon_\infty$	Training Method	Source	Acc. [%]	Adv. Acc. [%]	Cert. Ac
	COLT	Balunovic & Vechev (2020	) 78.42	66.17	61.
21255	CROWN-IBP	Zhang et al. $(2020)^{\dagger}$	71.27	59.58	58.
21233	IBP	Shi et al. (2021)	-	-	-
	SABR	this work	79.52	65.76	62.
	COLT	Balunovic & Vechev (2020	) 51.69	31.81	27.
81255	CROWN-IBP	Zhang et al. $(2020)^{\dagger}$	45.41	33.33	33.
0/233	IBP	Shi et al. (2021)	48.94	35.43	35.
	SABR	this work	52.00	35.70	35.
	Leaderb	ooards Paper FA	Q Con	tribute Mo	del Zoo

Leaderboard: CIFAR-10,  $\ell_{\infty} = 8/255$ , untargeted attack

						Search:	Papers, arc	hite
od	Standar d accurac y	AutoAttack robust accuracy	Best known robust accuracy	AA eval. potentially unreliable	Ex tr a da ta	Archit	tectur	Ve
tural Design Principles for Robust CNNs thetic images in training.	93.27%	71.07%	71.07%	×	×	RaWide 70	eResNet- -16	BN 20

**Formal Methods Community** 



12

Can we make formal methods interesting for the machine learning community?



13



## 

#### Training



#### Interpretability

CIKM 2021

VMCAI 2024



#### Verification

NFM 2023



## Training

CIKM 2021



#### Interpretability

VMCAI 2024



#### Verification

#### NFM 2023





## Using formal methods for robustness verification

Using formal methods interpretability-aware robustness verification



## Local Robustness Verification Combinations of Semantic Perturbations

- Brightness Change
- Patch Placement
- Object Translation



#### **Goal: Identifying Safe Ranges of Perturbation Parameters**





## Local Robustness Verification Classification Robustness is NOT ENOUGH!



18

## **Local Robustness Verification**

## 8 8 8 8 8 Input Image **Saliency Map** Saliency Maps Simonyan & al. @ ICLR 2014 Doa $\mathsf{map}_{j}(x) = \left| \frac{\partial f_{j}(x_{1}, \dots, x_{N})}{\partial x_{1}} \right| \dots \left| \frac{\partial f_{j}(x_{1}, \dots, x_{N})}{\partial x_{N}} \right|$



































































































































































19



### **Local Robustness Verification Saliency Map Robustness**

Input Image

**Saliency Map** 















**Expected Saliency Map** 

**Distance** 







2.52 2.18

Saliency Map Robustness







## (A Very Small) Example







### (A Very Small) Example **Saliency Maps**









-1 \* (x1 - 3\*x2 + x3 - 2\*x4) +1 \* (3\* x1 + x2 + 2\*x3 + x4) =





### (A Very Small) Example **Semantic Perturbations**









## **Encoding Semantic Perturbations** Mohapatra & al. @ CVPR 2020

Naïve verification approach:



Input Data Attack Parameter Perturbed Example

**Original Network Layers** 

...

Apply p-norm based verifiers



Apply p-norm based verifiers



Output



Output





## (A Very Small) Example Encoding Semantic Perturbations



26

#### **Naïve Breadth-First Search** Activation Patterns

ReLU(x)



27







## (A Very Small) Example **Classification Robustness**













## **Naïve Breadth-First Search**







31

### (A Very Small) Example Classification Robustness











### (A Very Small) Example **Naïve Breadth-First Search**





## **Naïve Breadth-First Search**



Patch Opacity



**TOO MANY ACTIVATION PATTERNS!** 

35

## **Geometric Boundary Search**

#### **Classification Robustness**



**Brightness Change** 



#### **Saliency Map Robustness**

#### **Brightness Change**





#### **Geometric Boundary Search Experimental Results**



#### **Classification Robustness**



**Saliency Map Robustness** 







37

## IIL Training

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#### Interpretability



#### Verification

#### NFM 2023







## Using formal methods for verification

## Using formal methods for something else than verification



## **Training**

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#### Interpretability



#### Verification

#### NFM 2023



40



Accuracy

**Support Vector Machines** 

Deep Neural Networks

![](_page_39_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_40_Figure_1.jpeg)

## **Support Vector Machines (SVMs)** Example

![](_page_41_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_41_Figure_2.jpeg)

43

## **Non-Linear SVMs** Kernel Functions

– Polynomial

- Radial Basis Function (RBF)

![](_page_42_Figure_3.jpeg)

**Input Space** 

![](_page_42_Figure_5.jpeg)

#### **Feature Space**

![](_page_42_Picture_7.jpeg)

44

#### **Feature Importance** Measuring Contribution of Input Features to Prediction

Permutation Feature Importance (PFI)

Partial Dependence (PD) Plots

Individual Conditional Expectation (ICE) Plots

Accumulated Local Effects (ALE) Plots

Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME)

SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP)

Individual Conditional Importance (ICI) Curves

Partial Importance (PI) Curves

Shapley Feature Importance (SFIMP)

Input Gradients

Abstract Feature Importance (AFI)

ocal		Mo	del-	Performance	Effect
LOCAI	GIODAI	Specific	Agnostic	-Bas	sed
	X		X	X	
	X		X		Χ
	X		X		X
	X		X		X
Χ			X		Χ
Χ			X		X
Χ			X	X	
Χ			X	X	
	X		Χ	X	
Χ			Χ	X	Χ
Х	X	Х			Х

![](_page_43_Picture_13.jpeg)

![](_page_43_Picture_14.jpeg)

45

#### **Abstract Feature Importance** Why Another Feature Importance Measure?

Permutation Feature Importance (PFI)

Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations

ations (SHAP)

Abstract Feature Importance (AFI)

- result may greatly vary depending on the dataset
- resource intensive when the number of feat
- misleading result when features

model accuracy

"Make Sense" but Give No Guarantees agrul optimal neighborhood: and easily manipulable explanations

s that the decision boundary is linear at the local

Tevel, but there is no theoretically guarantee that this is the case

- Shapley values estimations depend on the dataset
- assumes that features are independent
- has a very high computational cost, even for small models
- yields a formally correct by construction approximation
- does not depend from a dataset nor the accuracy of the model
- extremely fast to compute, whatever the number of features
- supports both linear and non-linear kernel functions

![](_page_44_Picture_19.jpeg)

![](_page_44_Picture_20.jpeg)

## **Abstract Interpretation**

![](_page_45_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_45_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_45_Picture_3.jpeg)

48

## **Abstract Interpretation**

![](_page_46_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_46_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_46_Picture_3.jpeg)

#### Using abstract interpretation for verification

Using abstract interpretation for something else than verification

![](_page_46_Picture_6.jpeg)

![](_page_46_Picture_7.jpeg)

## **Abstract Interpretation of SVMs**

![](_page_47_Figure_1.jpeg)

Image taken (and modified) from <a href="http://safeai.ethz.ch">http://safeai.ethz.ch</a>

![](_page_47_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_47_Picture_4.jpeg)

#### **Abstract Interpretation of SVMs Reduced Affine Form (RAF) Abstraction** SVM(x)sgn(SVM $\mathbb{R}^n$ $SVM^{\sharp}(x^{\sharp})$ RAF $(RAF_n)$ ۰۰۰**۴**۱ $RAF_n \stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$ $a_0 + \sum a_i \epsilon_i + a_r \epsilon_r \mid a_0, a_1, \dots a_n \in \mathbb{R}, a_r \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} > \bigcup \{$ i=1

![](_page_48_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_48_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_48_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_48_Picture_4.jpeg)

## **Abstract Interpretation of SVMs** Example

![](_page_49_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_49_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_50_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_50_Picture_2.jpeg)

## **Abstract Feature Importance (AFI)** Example

![](_page_51_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_51_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_51_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_51_Picture_4.jpeg)

#### **AFI vs PFI** German Dataset

			Grade for each feature									
	Baseline (13.55s)	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	Distance
Linear	AFI (0.01s)	5	5	5	6	6	7	8	7	7	8	1.0
	PFI (4.07s)	5	5	6	7	7	9	6	6	7	7	3.16
	Baseline (17.98s)	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	Distance
RBF	AFI (0.02s)	5	6	5	6	6	8	7	7	8	7	1.73
	PFI (6.23s)	6	7	5	6	7	8	7	6	7	5	4.24
Polynomial	Baseline (15.83s)	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	8	Distance
	AFI (0.01s)	7	6	7	7	5	7	6	6	5	8	4.47
	PFI (4.15s)	6	7	9	7	6	7	5	6	6	6	5.74

![](_page_52_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_52_Picture_3.jpeg)

## **AFI vs PFI**

	Bacolino	N = 2k	N = 10k	N = 2k	N = 10k	N = 2k	N = 5k	N = 10k	N = 2k	N = 5k	N = 10k
	Dasenne	$\epsilon = 0.2$	$\epsilon = 0.2$	$\epsilon = 0.4$	$\epsilon = 0.4$	$\epsilon = 0.6$	$\epsilon = 0.6$	$\epsilon = 0.6$	$\epsilon = 0.8$	$\epsilon = 0.8$	$\epsilon = 0.8$
Adult	AFI (0.27s)	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.41	1.0	1.0	1.41	1.0
Linear	PFI (10009s)	2.45	2.45	2.24	2.45	2.24	1.41	2.24	2.24	1.41	2.24
Adult	AFI (0.48s)	1.0	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.73	1.73	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41
RBF	PFI (25221s)	1.73	2.45	2.45	2.0	2.65	2.65	2.45	2.45	2.45	2.45
Adult	AFI (0.44s)	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.41	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Polynomial	PFI (9985s)	1.0	1.0	1.41	1.0	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41
Compas	AFI (0.22s)	1.41	1.41	1.73	1.73	1.41	1.73	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.73
Linear	PFI (1953s)	1.73	1.73	2.0	2.0	2.24	2.0	2.24	2.24	2.24	2.83
Compas	AFI (0.27s)	2.0	2.0	2.65	2.65	2.83	2.83	2.83	2.83	2.83	2.83
RBF	PFI (6827s)	2.0	2.0	2.65	2.65	2.83	2.83	2.83	2.83	2.83	2.83
Compas	AFI (0.22s)	4.24	4.24	4.12	4.12	4.24	4.24	4.24	4.24	4.24	4.24
Polynomial	PFI (2069s)	2.45	2.45	3.0	3.0	3.74	3.74	3.74	3.74	3.74	3.74
German	AFI (0.01s)	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.41	1.73	1.41
Linear	PFI (4.07s)	3.16	3.46	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.6	3.74	3.0
German	AFI (0.02s)	1.73	1.0	1.73	1.73	2.0	1.41	1.73	1.73	2.0	2.24
RBF	PFI (6.23s)	4.0	3.46	4.24	4.24	4.36	3.61	4.24	4.24	4.36	4.47
German	AFI (0.01s)	4.90	4.12	4.47	3.87	3.87	4.24	3.46	3.46	3.46	3.46
Polynomial	PFI (4.15s)	5.74	5.10	5.74	4.69	4.69	5.0	4.58	4.58	4.58	4.58

![](_page_53_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_54_Picture_0.jpeg)

Distance between	Adult				Compa	lS	German			
LIME and	Lin.	RBF	Poly	Lin.	RBF	Poly	Lin.	RBF	Poly	
AFI ( $\epsilon = 0.1$ )	2.42	2.04	2.98	1.67	1.06	3.05	2.62	2.03	5.31	
AFI ( $\epsilon = 0.2$ )	1.68	1.32	2.67	1.63	0.17	2.73	2.21	2.00	5.41	
AFI ( $\epsilon = 0.3$ )	1.39	0.51	2.58	1.57	0.14	2.62	1.92	2.05	5.45	
AFI (Global)	1.37	0.01	1.01	1.57	0.13	3.16	1.90	1.89	5.53	

![](_page_54_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_54_Picture_3.jpeg)

## IIL

Training

CIKM 2021

![](_page_55_Picture_3.jpeg)

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#### Interpretability

![](_page_55_Picture_7.jpeg)

#### Verification

#### NFM 2023

![](_page_55_Picture_10.jpeg)

57

![](_page_56_Picture_0.jpeg)

![](_page_56_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_56_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_57_Figure_0.jpeg)

## ertified Training $+ \alpha$ an Upper-Bound on the Worst-Case Loss

#### **Hybrid Training**

$$_{\mathrm{dv}}(x), y) + \alpha \ \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{ver}}(f(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}), y)$$

 $\mathcal{L}_{\text{ver}}(f(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}), y)$  $\leq$ hods Community Formal

![](_page_57_Picture_5.jpeg)

## **Hybrid Training** Random Forests

Detect		FATT		Natu	iral CART	CART with Hints			
Dataset	Accuracy %	Fairness %	Size	Accuracy %	Fairness %	Size	Accuracy %	Fairness %	Size
Adult	80.84	95.21	43	85.32	77.56	270	84.77	87.46	47
Compas	64.11	85.98	75	65.91	22.25	56	65.91	22.25	56
Crime	79.45	75.19	11	77.69	24.31	48	77.44	60.65	8
German	72.00	99.50	2	75.50	57.50	115	73.50	86.00	4
Health	77.87	97.03	84	83.85	79.98	2371	82.25	93.64	100
Average	74.85	90.58	43	77.65	52.32	572	76.77	70.00	43

![](_page_58_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_58_Figure_3.jpeg)

![](_page_58_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_59_Picture_0.jpeg)

#### Hybrid Training

#### CIKM 2021

VMCAI 2024

 $a_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i \epsilon_i + a_r \epsilon_r$ 

#### **Verification for** Interpretability

![](_page_59_Picture_7.jpeg)

![](_page_59_Picture_8.jpeg)

![](_page_59_Picture_9.jpeg)

#### Interpretability for Verification

NFM 2023

![](_page_59_Picture_12.jpeg)